Timothy Metter, a Prince George’s County police officer, sued the County after he was terminated without receiving an administrative hearing board, despite earlier communications to Metter and his union suggesting that a trial board would be offered. Metter had been arrested in 2022 and later pled guilty to misdemeanor second-degree assault. After the conviction, Police Chief Malik Aziz issued a Notice of Intent for Administrative Action advising that he intended to terminate Metter. Aziz’s Notice relied on a state statute, Maryland Public Safety § 3-107(c)(2)(ii)(2), which permits a police chief to terminate an officer convicted of “misdemeanor second degree assault.”
Metter, through counsel and his union, Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #89, argued that termination was not mandatory and that he should receive an administrative hearing board under the Maryland Police Accountability Act (MPAA). The Union filed a grievance asserting that the collective bargaining agreement did not permit termination without a hearing board and requested that the notice of termination be vacated.
On May 12, 2023, Aziz issued a revised notice stating that, “[a]lthough there has been an informal letter from the Attorney General that the [Administrative Charging Committee] process and trial boards do not apply to cases such as this involving a criminal conviction, per consideration and advice from the Office of Law, a trial board is being offered.” The revised notice further advised Metter that if he disagreed with Aziz’s final decision, “you may choose to proceed to a trial board pursuant to Maryland Annotated Code Public Safety Article Section 3-106.”
Metter’s counsel responded that, “[b]ased upon [Aziz]’s previous offer to refer this matter to a trial board and additional exchanges regarding the same, we will be seeking enforcement of Metter’s [Administrative Hearing Board].” But less than a month later, the County Office of Law reversed course. County attorney Rhonda Weaver advised Metter’s counsel that, after reviewing “the statute, its legislative history, and a letter of guidance from the Office of the Attorney General,” the County concluded that “the Police Chief can impose discipline directly and it is not required to submit the matter to the administrative charging committee or provide a trial board.”
Aziz ultimately terminated Metter without a hearing board. Metter then filed suit, arguing that the County had made a binding promise to provide a trial board and asking the Court to order the County to follow through with that promise. He contended that he relied on the County’s offer by refraining from continuing the grievance process through the Union.
The Appellate Court of Maryland rejected Metter’s claims and affirmed judgment for the County. The Court held that Maryland Public Safety § 3-106, which generally requires law enforcement agencies to establish a “trial board process,” must be read separately from § 3-107(c)(2)(ii), which gives a police chief discretion to terminate an officer convicted of certain crimes, including second-degree assault. The Court explained that the statutes were “disjunctive” and that the MPAA permitted Aziz to “take direct action to terminate the employment of Mr. Metter following the qualifying conviction.”
The Court repeatedly emphasized that the MPAA replaced the former Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBR), which previously provided broader disciplinary hearing protections for officers. Administrative hearing boards, the Court explained, “were a function of the LEOBR — repealed July 1, 2022 — prior to Mr. Metter’s conviction and all discussion between the parties.” The Court reasoned that Metter’s interpretation would improperly “add words to the statute that are not there” by effectively creating a guaranteed right to a trial board whenever a police chief declined to impose immediate termination.
The Court also concluded that the alleged promise of a hearing board was not legally enforceable because Aziz still retained full discretion under the statute to decide whether to proceed with a trial board or terminate Metter directly. The Court described any promise as “illusory” because Aziz retained the “unlimited right to decide later the nature or extent of his performance,” including whether to provide Metter “the courtesy of a forum to contest the allegations” or proceed directly to termination.
In addition, the Court found that the communications between the parties showed continuing legal review rather than a finalized agreement. The revised notice referred only to “proposed” discipline and stated that Aziz would issue a “final decision” later. The later letter from the County Office of Law removed the earlier language stating that “a trial board is being offered” and instead advised only that Metter could meet with Aziz before discipline became final. According to the Court, those changing communications demonstrated that “no final decision was made” and that the County never made a “final, unconditional promise” to provide a hearing board.
The Court therefore held that a police chief’s statutory authority to terminate an officer after a qualifying criminal conviction “cannot be circumvented by contract to guarantee the officer a disciplinary process unavailable to them.”
Metter v. Prince George’s County, No. 2511, Sept. Term 2024, 2026 WL 1328308 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 13, 2026).