On December 29, 2022, the City of Pittsburgh filed an appeal of Arbitrator Ralph Colflesh’s award to reinstate Police Officer Aaron Fetty, who had been terminated for indecent sexual assault — specifically, groping a coworker. The City had initially disciplined Fetty in September 2021 with a three-day unpaid suspension, a forced transfer away from his accuser, and a five-year last-chance agreement. But when the accuser obtained a final Sexual Violence Protection Order against Fetty in March 2022 after a plenary hearing, the City terminated him in July 2022. Colflesh found that the termination was barred by the 120-day limit in the collective bargaining agreement and ordered: “The City shall reinstate him to his pre-termination paygrade and duty as soon as practical and make him whole for all lost wages.”
The City did not move to stay the Colflesh Award. The Court of Common Pleas affirmed on April 20, 2023, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed that decision on March 6, 2024. However, as of the hearing before the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, the City had not returned Fetty to work in any capacity. The Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the City violated Sections 6(1)(a) and (e) of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act by refusing to comply with a final and binding arbitration award.
Before the Hearing Examiner, the City did not dispute that the Colflesh Award existed, that the appeal process had been exhausted, or that the Colflesh Award was final and binding. Instead, the City argued that the phrase “as soon as practical” was ambiguous. The City claimed that it could reasonably interpret that language as giving the employer discretion to decide when — or whether — reinstatement was “practical,” based on the adverse effect Fetty’s return might have on other officers and the Bureau of Police. The City pointed to concerns from a police commander and the city solicitor about morale and workplace safety.
The Hearing Examiner rejected that argument flatly. “The [Colflesh] Award does not say ‘when the City determines it to be practical,’” he wrote, “and I find such interpretations to be unreasonable.” He noted that the word “soon” meant the arbitrators intended Fetty to return “as quickly as possible.” The Hearing Examiner also found that Fetty had worked away from his accuser for approximately one year after the initial suspension without any complaints or problems, even after the accuser filed her emergency motion and obtained the final protective order. Commander Vinansky, who supervised Fetty during that period, testified he was unaware of any additional complaints. The City presented no evidence of any further incidents, and the last-chance agreement would have permitted termination if any had occurred.
The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board dismissed the City’s exceptions and made the Proposed Decision and Order final. The Board held that “there is nothing in the language of the [Colflesh Award] to indicate that the City has the discretion to delay the reinstatement of Officer Fetty until they determine if, and when, it is ‘practical’ to do so.” Colflesh’s intent, the Board found, was to return Fetty to his pre-termination status without delay.
The City petitioned for review to the Commonwealth Court, again arguing that the Colflesh Award was ambiguous and that no substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that Fetty worked without incident after his original suspension. The City pointed to the absence of explicit language in the Colflesh Award itself about the absence of complaints and argued the Board had relied on a finding that did not exist in the record.
The Commonwealth Court affirmed. The Court agreed with the Board that “as soon as practical” was unambiguous and required prompt reinstatement. The City’s reading — that the phrase granted the employer indefinite discretion to defer relief — was unreasonable and would render the Colflesh Award illusory. The Court noted that the City cited no authority supporting its ambiguity argument. Hughes v. City of Bethlehem, an FMLA case interpreting “as soon as practicable” in the notice context, did not suggest that an employee entitled to leave could decide when to give notice at her own convenience, let alone that an employer could defer reinstatement indefinitely.
The Court rejected the City’s substantial evidence challenge. Even if the Board’s interpretation depended on a finding that Fetty worked without additional incidents, substantial evidence supported that finding. Commander Vinansky testified that he heard no additional complaints. The City presented no evidence of any further incidents. And the last-chance agreement would have mandated termination if any had occurred. The Court reiterated that resolving conflicts in evidence, assessing credibility, and drawing inferences are functions of the Board, not the reviewing court.
The Commonwealth Court did not condone Fetty’s underlying conduct, obviously. But the Colflesh Award was final and binding, its language was clear, and the City’s refusal to comply was an unfair labor practice. The Court affirmed the Board’s order.
City of Pittsburgh v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 2026 WL 1165241 (Pa. Cmwlth. Apr. 2, 2026).