Will Twigg worked as a corrections deputy sheriff for the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office in Florida while also serving in the armed forces. During his employment, he periodically took military leave. Before returning from one period of service, he also took leave under the FMLA because of medical issues and advised the Sheriff’s Office that he wanted to move into an administrative position or otherwise perform strictly administrative duties.
The Sheriff’s Office informed Twigg that his law-enforcement certification with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement had lapsed and that certification was required for continued employment. The Sheriff’s Office also advised that it could not evaluate his request for accommodation without medical documentation and gave him ten days to submit information concerning his condition.
Twigg subsequently submitted a note from a licensed clinical social worker explaining that he suffered from PTSD from combat trauma. The note stated that his triggers included “sudden loud noises, feeling trapped or unable to leave, crowded environments, sudden or significant changes, conflict, and prolonged high stress.” It further explained that when he experienced an episode, “it was difficult for him to focus and engage with others,” and that he “requires flexible break and leave options to let him exit a triggering situation and calm himself down.” After reviewing the job description, the social worker concluded that Twigg was unable to work in a position requiring him to “regularly respond to violent or emergency situations,” though she believed he could work in an “administrative or clerical setting” with “reasonable accommodations.”
The same day the note was submitted, the Sheriff’s Office Chief Human Resources Officer, Karen Thomas, concluded that Twigg could not perform the corrections deputy sheriff position with or without a reasonable accommodation. Thomas determined that the administrative or clerical positions identified by Twigg would still require him to serve as a deputy sheriff and therefore perform the same essential functions. She also concluded that his restrictions precluded placement in any vacant position and observed that his certification remained inactive. Sheriff Ric Bradshaw approved Thomas’s recommendation that Twigg be terminated.
Twigg filed suit alleging violations of the ADA, the FMLA, and USERRA. The district court granted summary judgment to the Sheriff’s Office on all three claims: denying Twigg’s request to alter or amend the judgment, denying his request to extend discovery, and granting a protective order preventing him from deposing Sheriff Bradshaw. Twigg appealed.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board.
Addressing the ADA claim, the Court focused on whether Twigg was a “qualified individual” capable of performing the essential functions of the position with or without a reasonable accommodation. The Court found there was “no reasonable dispute” that responding to violent or emergency situations was an essential function of a corrections deputy sheriff. The position description identified emergency response as an “essential job duty,” and both Twigg and Thomas testified that emergency response was an essential part of the job.
The Court concluded that Twigg “could not perform these essential functions even with an accommodation.” Relying on the social worker’s note, the Court observed that Twigg could not “regularly respond to violent or emergency situations” and had conceded that his disability prevented him from responding to emergencies. His proposal that he be assigned to an administrative role failed because the positions he identified still required him to “respond to emergencies and maintain order if needed,” while other requested positions either did not exist or would have required the creation of new jobs. The Court reiterated that the Sheriff’s Office was “under no obligation to eliminate essential functions from a role to accommodate Twigg or to create new positions to suit him.”
The Court also emphasized that Twigg “never identified a specific vacant position for which he was qualified.” While he argued he would have accepted “any administrative or clerical position,” he presented no evidence that such a position existed at the time of his termination. Thomas, by contrast, testified that she could not find any vacant positions that Twigg was qualified to fill given his restrictions.
A separate problem was Twigg’s certification status. The Court noted that it was undisputed that Twigg had not obtained the certification required under Florida law. Because an officer who fails to maintain certification “cannot remain employed,” the Court concluded that certification was itself an essential requirement of the position.
The Court reached similar conclusions on the FMLA and USERRA claims. Because Twigg could not perform the essential functions of his position, he had no right to reinstatement under the FMLA. As for USERRA, the Court found that Twigg “presented no evidence that his termination was motivated by his military service.” Rather, the record showed that he served throughout his employment and “took leave several times without issue.” According to the Court, “[i]t was only after his certification lapsed and he became unable to perform the essential functions of his position that he was terminated.”
The Eleventh Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment in full.
Will Twigg v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 2026 WL 1897045 (11th Cir. July 1, 2026).